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An important problem of many complex systems is that of assess-
ing the reliability in the minimum probability of survival, from the 
reliabilities of the components. If system performance can be repre-
sented by a network flow diagram, the system probability of failure 
can be expressed in terms of path probabilities of failure, each of 
which is a function of component failure probabilities. 
Measurement errors and other uncertainties place an interval of 
ambiguity around the mean value of system probability of failure and 
each path and component failure probability. Associated with a 
specified reliability R that a failure probability will lie within 
an interval is a confidence C in that reliability. The statement 
that the system probability of failure lies within a specified inter-
val with a declared reliability R implies a derivable confidence in 
that statement. 
A formalism for analyzing the reliability R of an interval for 
system probability of failure and its confidence C from the component 
R-C intervals is outlined as follows: 
1. Obtain the network representation of the system, in which 
the (dependent) path failure probabilities are indicated 
relative to their component failure probabilities. 
2. Derive by an algorithm such as "STOp"l a representation 
of the system by disjoint paths and their state probabili-
ties. The system probability of failure is a sum of these. 
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3. Declare an R-reliable interval for each component probabil-
ity of failure and express a confidence in that interval. 
4. For a declared R-reliable interval for system probability 
of failure derive the confidence in that interval. 
The general formalism will now be developed with reference to 
aircraft engine component retirement-for-cause. 2 
THE GENERAL CASE, APPLIED TO AIRCRAFT ENGINE FAILURE 
An aircraft engine can fail when one or more rotor components 
fail; we assume for simplification no other types of failure. Each 
rotor component can fail because of one or more flaws, such as corner 
flaws in the balance flange scallop or disk line rim. Therefore the 
network diagram consists of paths for the various rotor components, 
each path passing through nodes representing the flaws peculiar to 
that rotor component. 
These network paths are not independent if they share common 
flaws. In such a case algorithms can be utilized to derive a set 
of disjoint paths whose state probabilities depend on the various 
flaws Fl, F2, ... , as indicated in Table 1. The table shows, for 
example, that the state probability of path 1 for rotor component 1 
is the product of the following probabilities: Fl being in state 1 
(non-failure), F4 being in state 0 (failure), ... 
A table such as Table 1 yields the probability of system fail-
ure, PF' as a sum of the disjoint path state probabilities, 
N 
L Pn (1) 
n=l 
Table 1. Disjoint Paths and Their State Probabilities as Indicated 
by the States of Their Flaws. 
Paths n 
1 
2 
3 
Fl 
1 
o 
o 
F2 
1 
o 
Flawsa,b 
F3 F4 
o 
aO(l) indicates the flaw has (has not) caused failure. 
ba dash indicates a flaw irrelevant to the probability of failure 
for that path. 
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each Pn being a product of probabilities of the flaw states in that 
path (i.e., rotor component). 
To avoid confusion it is convenient to subtract from (1) the 
expected values of the probabilities, (PF> and (Pn> and write 
in the form 
x (2) 
X can be regarded as a sum of steps xn with random lengths, and one 
can study the statistics for an R-C interval for X (i.e., system 
p,robability of failure, in terms of the statistics for R-C intervals 
of the xn ' i.e., flaw state probabilities). 
For aircraft engine retirement-for-cause we ask the question: 
given intervals for the path state probabilities in which they are 
expected to lie at least lOOR% of the time, with associated confi-
dences, what is the confidence Cx that the engine probability-of-
survival will lie within a given interval at least lOOR% of the time? 
The R-C figures for an interval of engine probabi1ity-of-survival 
measure the errors and uncertainties involved in the assessment of 
engine performance. 
R-C Intervals for the Path State Probabilities 
Figure 1 introduces the probability T(q) of stress q as a vector, 
q (ql, •.• ,qS), with components indicated by superscripts to dis-
tinguish them from paths and flaws. T determines the statistics of 
path state probability Pn(q) and system probability of survival. 
A given q causes specific probabilities of failure via the 
various flaws and a corresponding value of state probability Pn(q) 
for path n. It is the task of fracture mechanics and/or NDE to 
evaluate these flaw_failure pr~babilities and the Pn(q). A probabil-
ity distribution T(q} for the q will impose a distribution on the 
Pn(q} of which 
is the average. Defining xn(q} = Pn - (Pn>, the probability that 
xn(q) lies in a range [-en, en] is 
q2 (en) -f dq} dq (4) 
ql (-en) 
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The statement that the path state probability lies in this range 
100R% of the time means 
R (5) 
and, because the T~distribution is completely specified, the confi-
dence in this R-reliable range is 100 %. 
In practice the T-distribution is not completely known because 
of errors, uncertainties and incomplete information, so we designate 
it as T(ql~), ~ = (VI, ••• ,vM) being a vector of imperfectly known 
par~meters. Now the statement that [-en' en] is R-reliable for 
Xn(q) is 
q2 
f T(qll~) dq < R (6) 
Equation (6) defines a region vnR of parameter space. The cODfidence 
Cn that [-en' eR] is indeed R-reliable is the probability of v falling 
within the vnR region, 
-f g(vlmeasurements) dv 
g is an ad hoc probability function which may very well involve an 
unknown "prior" distribution. This could be chosen to represent 
maximum ignorance. 
Fig. 1. The probability of stress q, T(q) and the state probability 
Pn(q) of path n. 
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The R-C Interval for the System Probability of Failure 
According to (2) the engine fai!ure probability about its mean 
value is, for a given stress vector q, 
N 
X(q) = L xn(q) (8) 
n=l 
Designa~e Tx(I~) as the probability of X for a given v, averaged 
over T(q). The assertion that the interval [-E, E] is R-reliable 
for X is 
E 
f TX (xl~) dX > R (9) 
-E 
and this actually defines a region vxR of parameter space v. 
Markoff's Method3 yields explicit formulas by which this vxR 
region can be found: 
00 
T (xl~ 
x 
1 
21T (10) 
-00 
where AN(P) is given completely generally as 
N 
AN(P) = f dql ••• f dqs exp[ip L xn (q)] T(qlv). (11) 
n=l 
The confidence_CX that [-E, EJ is indeed R-reliable for X is 
the probability of v falling within this vxR region: 
f g(~lmeasurements) d~ = Cx (12) 
A SIMPLIFIED CASE FOR GAUSSIAN POPULATIONS 
The foregoing very general formalism simplifies considerably 
if the following conditions are valid: 
1. The path state probabilities xn in (2) are independent. 
This would be so if the flaws determining one path (rotor 
component) state prob~bility did not affect any other path 
pro~ab!lity. Then T(qlv) would become a product of 
Tn(qnlvn) for the individual paths. 
2. Each path probability T is Gaussian with unknown variance 
vn ' with stress q relative to the value at xn = 0 measured 
directly by Xu' Then Tn = Tn(xnlvn ). 
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3. nn measurements are made to estimate Pn by the sample 
variance sn. 
Under these conditions (6) would evaluate to the form 
(13) 
for the nth path, vnR being a boundary point separating vn space 
into R-reliable and non-R-reliable portions. Eq. (7) would read 
c = n 
g(vnlsn } can be written with the aid of Bayes' Theorem as 
(14) 
(1s) 
where f(snlvn} is the chi-squared distribution with nn degrees of 
freedom. If the "prior" g(vn ) is taken to be g exp(-e:vn ) over O~vn~oo and e: is sufficiently large to keep g(vnlsn ) from having an 
impractically large variance (because (Pn> + xn must not extend 
appreciably outside [O,l]) then (14) is of the form 
(16) 
We have a simplification in the X-population since it too must 
be Gaussian. If Vx is its variance, Vx = EV n and (9) becomes 
Eq. (12) is of the form 
c = x f 
v ~ v 
x xR 
(17) 
(18) 
and this may be evaluated from the Markoff Eq. (10) and (II), the 
latter allowing analytic solution if the nn are odd and ~ 3. 
The final solution for Cx involves sums and products of a num-
ber of integrals which can be quickly evaluated in the complex plane 
by an adaptive integration algorithm. 
The details of the solution will not be presented because of 
the special nature of the conditions assumed. 
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